Last updated on 2021-01-07
Expect a South Dakota Supreme Court ruling issued last week to prompt remedial legislation come January. In a twisted but unanimous ruling in State v. Bryant, our highest court held that a guy who stuck a knife in another guy’s gut does not have to pay restitution to South Dakota’s Medicaid program for covering the victim’s hospital bills.
Writing for the court, Justice Janice Kern notes that Idiot General Jason Ravnsborg’s bumbling recitation of procedural arguments isn’t enough to prevent the court from reading the plain language of the law and finding that Medicaid is not a person entitled to victim’s compensation. SDCL 22-1-2(31) and SDCL 23A-28-2(5) underpin the ruling:
“Person,” any natural person, unborn child, association, limited liability company, corporation, firm, organization, partnership, or society. If the term is used to designate a party whose property may be the subject of a crime or petty offense, it also includes the United States, any other country, this state, and any other state or territory of the United States, and any of their political subdivisions, agencies, or corporations [South Dakota Codified Law 22-1-2(31), last amended 2020].
“Victim,” any person, as defined in subdivision 22-1-2(31), who has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant’s criminal activities, including any person who has by contract or by statute undertaken to indemnify another or to pay or provide a specified or determinable amount or benefit upon determinable contingencies. Any victim who has suffered pecuniary damages has priority of claim as opposed to any person who has a claim to indemnity or subrogation as a result of the same defendant’s criminal activity [SDCL 23A-28-2(5)].
Justice Kern says Medicaid is a funding program, not an association, limited liability company, corporation, firm, organization, partnership, or society and thus cannot be considered a person victimized by a defendant’s criminal activities.
The circuit court thus committed an error in requiring the stabber to pay Medicaid back for stitching up the actual person he perforated… but Justice Kern says it wasn’t a “plain error.” This ruling on this specific tandem of statutes “results in a mixed message as to the correct interpretation of the statute.” The circuit court evidently relied on past cases and other statutes that have led our Supreme Court to rule that the Department of Social Services is not a restitutable victim (but can get restitution under another statute), that Indian Health Services is, that a health insurer isn’t, and that Medicaid is when covering medical costs for a juvenile harmed in a crime.
That’s confusing enough that the Supreme Court gives the circuit court a pass for making the stabber pay Medicaid $31,246.69. That bill did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights (um, note to the Court: taking $31,246.69 out of my hide pretty substantially affects most South Dakotans’ rights, but we appear to be talking courtroom due process, not practical life, liberty, and property). The circuit ordered the restitution after conviction, so it did not “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” (and I’ll grant that telling a stabber he doesn’t have to compensate us for stitching back together the guts of the guy he stabbed might affect the public reputation of the judicial proceedings in the other direction). Justice Kern writes, “We, therefore, deny his request to remand the case to the circuit court to vacate the restitution award.”
A guy with anger management issues who slices up another man’s tummy deserves a book or two thrown at him. But if the plain language of the law says Medicaid isn’t a restitutable victim, hearing the Supreme Court leave in place an extralegal penalty doesn’t sit well with me. If the law doesn’t say the state can take your money, the state shouldn’t get your money, even if you’re a knucklehead with anger management issues.
But now that the Supreme Court has made the statute clear, defendants in similar situations can stave off orders to pay back Medicaid for the physical damage they do to low-income South Dakotans. I don’t expect legislators to ride to the rescue of low-income South Dakotans, but they will mobilize to protect our state budget from hooligans. Expect some enterprising tough-on-crime legislator to propose a bill in the 2021 Session to amend one or both of the key statutes on which Justice Kern’s opinion rests. For the purposes of restitution for criminal acts, the Legislature will find a way to declare Medicaid a victimizable person.
Just for clarification, when the appellate court analyzes a case under the “plain error” standard this means that the asserted error was never raised or objected to in the trial court. In an effort provide confidence in trial court decisions, and to assure a general finality of trial court decisions, legislatures have enacted rules that deny appellate courts the power to grant relief unless a litigant raises a legal or factual issue in the trial court.
Basically, if a litigant fails to raise an argument before the trial court that argument is forfeited on appeal and appellate courts cannot legally grant relief even where a mistake has been made. The “plain error” rule is an exception to this rule of finality that requires a showing of more than than a mere mistake of law or fact – the mistake must have been “obvious” and “substantial.” While I haven’t read Judge Kern’s decision in this case nor reviewed the niceties of SD’s own version of “plain error” jurisprudence, the SD Supreme Court’s denial of relief in this case does not seem unusual based on the information in Cory’s post.
Thanks, BCB, for that additional explanation. Justice Kern does write that issuing a “plain error” ruling requires clearing some pretty high hurdles.
¡No hay de que Cory! The Court’s ruling seems to have focused more on the ambiguity in the law created by prior published appellate decisions, making the trial court mistake less than “obvious.” As you point out, however, with this decision any similar future mistake by a trial court will likely be considered “obvious” and the question under plain error review will then focus primarily on whether the mistake was “substantial,” which typically means it adversely affected a litigant’s substantial rights.
I suppose this is somewhat like dog bite law. The owner of the dog is supposed to be liable for all costs incurred for medical care of the bite. Often people have insurance that covers that sort of expense. Maybe we should require crooks and known hotheads to get stabbing insurance. I think gun owners should be required to have similar policies.
I’m still surprised, BCB, that there would be any discussion or hurdle-clearing after the initial finding that the law does not such restitution. If Medicaid isn’t a restitutable, victimizable person, the court doesn’t seem to have any authority to offer such erroneous restitution, even if that offer doesn’t adversely affect the defendant’s substantial rights.
Cory, I am with you on the “substantial rights” language. Normally any order requiring a defendant to pay restitution or damages would satisfy that aspect of the “plain error” analysis.
To try to understand the Court’s reasons for the “substantial rights” ruling I finally took a look at the published opinion:
https://law.justia.com/cases/south-dakota/supreme-court/2020/28979.html
There is virtually no analysis. At ¶33 the Court simply states”
This makes no sense to me. If I understand correctly what will happen to Bryant based on this unlawful restitution order, some percentage whatever meager pay he earns from his prison labors will be impacted (i.e withheld from him) and his purchasing power to buy whatever minimal goods might be available from the prison commissary will be reduced. In my view this impact satisfies the “substantial rights” test and the Court could have remanded with directions to eliminate this restitution order without reversing his conviction or any other aspect of his sentence.
Even a bit more troubling is why the Court adopted this language at all. The case was essentially over when the Court found that the law was not obvious. There was no need for any comment one way or the other about whether Bryant’s “substantial rights” were impacted, so the quoted language is mere dicta.